



# Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association Luncheon Feb 23, 2012

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# Joint Operational Access Concept



**Central Idea: Cross-domain synergy.** To meet that challenge, future joint forces will leverage *cross-domain synergy*—the complementary vice merely additive employment of capabilities in different domains such that each enhances the effectiveness and compensates for the vulnerabilities of the others—to establish superiority in some combination of domains that will provide the freedom of action required by the mission.



- ✓ Proposes a common joint lexicon and provides foundation for capability development
- ✓ Expands the understanding of access beyond 'high-end'
- ✓ Expands the understanding of access beyond the establishment of sea and air control
- ✓ Identifies general principles for achieving operational access



# Where Has Access Been Required?



## Engage Forward



### Southern / Africa Partnership:

- MPS, HSV, Amphibs

### Ulchi Focus Lens, Cobra Gold, Bright Star:

- MPS / Amphibs

### Rotational Presence:

- ARG / MEU

(PACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM)

## Respond to Crisis



### East Timor Peace Op: '99

- ARG/MEU

### Tsunami HA/DR: '04

- MPSRON / 5 Amphibs

### Lebanon NEO: '06

- ARG/MEU

### Haiti HA/DR: '10

- MPSRON / 7 Amphibs

### Libya/Japan/Pakistan HA/DR:

- ARG/MEU (s)

## Project Power



### Desert Storm: '90

- 2 x MPSRON / 30 Amphibs

### Somalia: '92

- MPSRON / ARG/MEU

### Afghanistan: TF 58; '01

- 2 x ARG/MEU

### Iraq: '03

- 2 x MPSRON /  
23 Amphibs

Phase 2:  
Seize the Initiative

Phase 1: Deter the Enemy


Phase 0: Shape the Environment



# Air Sea Battle...What is New



- **New A2/AD Capabilities and strategies challenge U.S. ability to project power:**
  - Getting to the fight is a fight
  - Previously forces set conditions; in A2/AD, conditions drive forces
- **Implications for US warfare & mobilization /deployment are significant:**
  - US forces must transition from operational defense to operational offense
- **At tactical level, A2/AD is not new, but its future and implications are unclear:**
  - Return to fighting degraded but in a networked force....new implications
  - Cyber and space are new domains of warfare







# Marine Corps Role in Air-Sea Battle



- MAGTFs that are afloat or based overseas will already be operating within an A2/AD threat envelop...regional awareness...enabling allies...creating decision space
- Seize or defend advance bases, airfields, critical infrastructure or key terrain
- Mobility and dispersion of embarked forces confounds enemy targeting promotes readiness and enables rapid response.
- Providing depth to critical capabilities
- Amphibious raids destroying or neutralizing hidden and re-locatable land based A2/AD systems
- Support for other operations, defense against swarm boats, TRAP, HA/DR and re-supply
- Transition to forcible entry and sustained operations. Continuity between ASB and JOA the as adversaries seek to regenerate capabilities or apply more innovative A2/AD approaches.
- OMFTS, STOM and Trans-Domain, Multi-Capable Character





# Ship-to-Objective Maneuver



## Military Problem:

- ❖ Operations are frequently challenged by a variety of impediments to access:
  - ❖ Natural disasters
  - ❖ Lack of or degraded host nation infrastructure
  - ❖ Diplomatic / sovereignty issues
  - ❖ Population density in the crowded littorals
  - ❖ Simple and sophisticated weapons in the hands of state and increasingly, non-state actors



## Central Question:

- ❖ How does the US overcome various access challenges to achieve the required result?





# Ship-to-Objective Maneuver



## Amphibious Operations:

- ❖ Numerous challenges to access
  - ❖ Political
  - ❖ Environmental
  - ❖ Military
- ❖ Operations include assaults, raids, demonstrations, withdrawals, and amphibious support to other operations. These five types of amphibious operations support theater security cooperation, building partner capacity, crisis response, small scale contingencies and assaults to enable the joint force.
- ❖ Many of the capabilities critical in MCO are also key to success across the ROMO





# Key Capabilities of STOM



## ❖ Mobility

- ❖ Vertical & surface options
- ❖ Capability & capacity for high & low-end

## ❖ Command and Control

- ❖ Decentralized execution & common picture

## ❖ Intelligence

- ❖ Locate & identify forces & impediments to mobility
- ❖ Pull vice push information

## ❖ Fires

- ❖ Immediate & responsive – all weather – lethal & non lethal
- ❖ Unmanned systems

## ❖ Information Operations and Computer Network Operations


## ❖ Sea-based Operations and Logistics







# Naval Integration is Critical



**LMSR**  
Military Sealift Command's (MSC) large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ship (LMSR), program significantly expands the nation's sealift capability as prime movers of U.S. military equipment. The ships carry vehicles and equipment to support humanitarian missions, as well as combat missions

**Mobile Landing Platform**  
Leverages Float on -Float Off technology and has reconfigurable mission deck to attain a vehicle staging area, sideport ramp, large mooring fenders, and LCAC lanes. This provides a pier in the ocean capability that has utility across the Range of Military Operations.

**LHA(R)**  
Lifts and supports over 1300 Marines and the MAGTF command and control nodes -- is main base for its fixed (JSF), rotary wing / tilt-rotor, and unmanned aircraft systems. Well deck supports simultaneous landing craft ops. Level II medical capability.

**LPD-17**  
Used to move and support over 700 Marines and their equipment and supplies by embarked LCACs, conventional landing craft, amphibious vehicles and rotary lift craft.

**LSD**  
Largest capacity to operate landing craft in support of MAGTF operations.

**Ship to Shore Connector (SSC)**  
SSC program intended to provide a modernized replacement for the LCAC fleet.

**T-AKE**  
The T-AKE will primarily contribute to prepositioning a MEB's supply stocks and sustaining both the sea-based squadron and brigade forces operating ashore.

*In future crises, forward-based and forward-deployed amphibious and MPF forces will continue to demonstrate their inherent flexibility and utility by aggregating with surged forces to conduct engagement, crisis response, or forcible entry operations.*



# Expeditionary Warrior 2012

## Expands upon ideas in the *Joint Operational Access Concept*



March 5-9, Westin Washington, DC City Center

- **BACKGROUND:** **Expeditionary Warrior** is the Marine Corps' Title 10 Wargame. EW is a venue to address issues of concern to senior USMC leaders and informs concept development and doctrine refinement.
- **PURPOSE:** Assess and identify challenges and opportunities in a sea-based, expeditionary force's ability to respond to crisis and gain operational access in a 2024 A2/AD environment, in order to enable a joint/combined force.



We are rigorously examining the application of capabilities across domains to defeat anti-access/area denial challenges, and thereby gain joint force access and freedom of action, in order to inform future capability development



# How EW is Different This Year




- Past wargames compressed Planning, Discussion, Outbrief into a single week
- EW12 – extended along multiple pathway events
  - Planning - MPC/CONOPS Workshop (Nov 2011)
  - Discussion - Main Wargame (5-9 March 2012)
  - Executive Outbrief (23 Mar 2012)
- Main Wargame will be focused on rigorous participant discussion and insight generation
  - Objective-driven vignettes and research questions
  - Guest Speaker and Lunch and two Panels (A2/AD and Joint lodgement)
  - Bold Alligator Integration



# Scenario - 2024



- Unclassified, fictional scenario set in littoral West Africa, 2024
  - US and Coalition forces intervene to defend US ally against internal non-state actor and invading neighbor.
  - Wide range of terrain (multiple rivers, poor infrastructure, large coastal population center).
- US/Coalition Objective:
  - Enforce UN mandate to re-establish the territorial integrity of the ally and neutralize enemy offensive capability.
- Allied Nation
  - Weak state rapidly losing territory to adversaries.
- Adversaries
  - Irregular and conventional enemy.
  - Possess irregular and conventional capabilities with significant A2/AD, ballistic and anti-ship cruise missiles.
- Scenario vetted by USAFRICOM and MARFORAF.





# Work That Needs to Be Done




- ❖ How close can amphibious ships close to the beach given current and future threats?
- ❖ How do we meet GCC demand for engagement and response?
- ❖ What level of detail is required in a CONOP for establishing sea echelon areas, assault lanes etc. and is one necessary?
- ❖ How can we better examine the impact of company landings?
- ❖ How do we defeat G-RAMM and other A2/AD technologies?
- ❖ To what level do we need to define our naval fires requirements and what is the best setting?
- ❖ How do MAGTF electronic warfare capabilities enable STOM operations?
- ❖ How do we train and evaluate MEB/Expeditionary Strike Group operations?
- ❖ How do we integrate naval fires C2 requirements?



# Where We're Going



- Overhauling the Expeditionary Force Development System
- Equipment Oversight Board
- Tying process to PPBE
- Re-defining Core and Core+ mission sets



- ❑ We must balance desired capability with economic reality and reduce our systems inventory and our sustainment and training costs
- ❑ We must develop innovative approaches to sustaining and educating our force
- ❑ We must develop solutions that are not system-centric, but that enhance leader-centric, network enabled operations today and in the future.



Questions



# Back Ups





# Proposed FY 2013 Budget Investments



- **Enhancing programs vital to our ground combat elements**
  - Light Armored Vehicles (LAV), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System (STUAS)
- **Maintaining the same investment levels in other enabling programs**
  - Ground Aviation Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR), Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN), Command and Control Situational Awareness (C2/SA)
- **Fully funding critical research and development efforts**
  - Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV)
- **Sustaining other ground and tactical vehicles until their replacements can be procured**
  - High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV)
- **Procuring full programs of record critical to aviation modernization**
  - F-35B, H-1 Upgrades, MV-22B, KC-130J, CH-53K




# Challenges to Access Across the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

- Environment may be *permissive, uncertain, or hostile*
  - Uncertain environment likely to predominate
  - Widely proliferated shorter-range ASCM can be negated by initiating littoral maneuver from over the horizon

*Most dangerous but applicable to a more limited portion of ROMO*

*Most likely across greater portion of ROMO*





# Navy USMC AirForce Way Ahead



In order to develop viable solutions to counter anti-access and area denial capabilities, the Services' should build upon the momentum created by recent collaboration. Specifically, the USMC, Navy and USAF should further examine cross-Service capability application in the following areas:

- Strike in support of maneuver and entry operations
- Littoral maneuver/raids in support of air control
- Crisis response against adversaries with precision weaponry
- Mine counter-mine operations
- Leveraging STOVL in air power application to counter anti-access and area denial capabilities (e.g. develop CONOPS)
- Operations when space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrums are interrupted or degraded



# Joint Force Way Ahead



- Emerging global anti-access / area denial threat impacts to air, sea, space and land domains will continue to grow
- While U.S. Joint Forcible Entry (JFE) capabilities exist now and offer the best counter to these threats ... to assure that capability, we must:
  - Codify the national JFE requirement in the “Gold-Standard’ Documents
  - Refine the GRF construct to ensure it includes a “complete” Operational Access package, supportable within the GFM process
    - Sufficient strategic airlift and sealift
    - Airborne objective force with required enablers
    - 2 x MEB assault echelons with minimum 33 amphibious ships
    - 3 x MEB (MPS) enabled
  - Synchronize Joint Service training requirements and opportunities with Combatant Commanders and the Services
  - Continue to develop enhanced joint concepts, methods, and capabilities to assure U.S. freedom of maneuver and action



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